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Abstract
This paper uses the technology adoption general equilibrium model developed by
Moscoso Boedo (2006) to analyze the transition for the countries of the former
USSR and Eastern Europe. There the real output displayed a U-shapped pattern
together with increases in inequality, which are features matched by the model
1. Introduction
The collapse of communism in the early 1990s initiated a set of transformations that
continue to take place today in Eastern Europe and Asia. After the communist regimes
fell, a transition to a market economy took place, with patterns that repeated themselves
in almost all of the former centrally planned economies. Among the most notable eﬀects
of this transition we can point out a U-shape behavior of GDP per capita, and a sharp
increase in income inequality.
∗ 1180 Observatory Dr. Madison, WI, 53703. Email: moscosoboedo@wisc.edu.Can these changes be explained by a model of technology adoption? In other words,
can the events in Eastern Europe and the former USSR be rationalized as the introduc-
tion of technology adoption mechanisms that generated these distinct patterns?
The focus of this paper is to try to understand the sudden transition from com-
munism to capitalism as a technology adoption phenomenon. The model developed
in Moscoso Boedo (2006) provides a good framework to analyze the behavior of these
economies.
The work by Milanovic (1998), which studies the evolution of various indicators
in the post communist transition, focused on income, poverty and inequality, when
referring to the evolution of output argues that "After the Great Depression of 1929-33,
this decline represents the largest peacetime contraction of world output".
In terms of income distribution Milanovic (1998) documents increases in the Gini
coeﬃcient in every country involved, with an average of 9 points, from 24 to 33 in a
v e r ys h o r tp e r i o do ft i m e .
The increases in income inequality seem to be a feature common in many transition
processes. Latin America in the 1990s experienced rising levels of inequality together
with policies that opened its markets to foreign competition and investment. China is
also an example where the levels of inequality are rising dramatically.
The diﬀerence between cases like Latin America or China and Eastern Europe or the
republics of the former Soviet Union is that GDP per capita suﬀered an abrupt decrease
in Eastern Europe an the former USSR, whereas the 1990s were years of positive growth
in both Latin America and China.
The dissimilar reactions experienced in China vs.. the centrally planned
economies of Eastern Europe or the republics of the former Soviet Union may be ex-
plained by the way the collapse of the soviet regime took place. In the Soviet Union
2and satellite states in Eastern Europe, the communist regime fell in a matter of months,
whereas in China, the transition to capitalism has been much smoother, and may ex-
plain the diﬀerent behavior in the macro variables. The sudden collapses of the regimes
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union present a better scenario to analyze the eﬀect of
an unforeseen and abrupt regime change compared to China due to the speed in which
the changes took place.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model economy based in
Moscoso Boedo (2006), where the choice of production technology is at the center of the
economic problem. Section 3 calibrates the model to the former soviet states. Section
4 analyzes the dynamics of income distribution and output per worker in the event of a
sudden regime change predicted by the model and ﬁnally section 5 concludes.
2. The Model Economy
The model used to analyze the eﬀects of the fall of communist regimes in the former
USSR and Eastern Europe is the same as the one developed in Moscoso Boedo (2006).




The planner in this economy maximizes (2.1), subject to the following budget con-
straint
Ct + It ≤ F (bt,K pt,S pt,U pt) (2.2)
where Ct denotes consumption in period t, It denotes investment in physical capital
3in period t,a n dF() denotes the production function of ﬁnal goods. F() is a function
of the following: bt indexes the technology adopted in period t,t h a ti s ,t h e r ew i l lb e
a continuum of functions F(bt,·) indexed by bt which is a continuum variable from 0 to
1 ,a n di np e r i o dt the actual production function adopted will be that indexed by bt.
Once the production function is determined by bt the amount produced is a function of
the physical capital, the skilled labor and the unskilled labor devoted to the production
of ﬁnal goods, Kpt,S pt,a n dUpt respectively.
Technological change is costly. The function G(bt,b t+1) maps changes in the pro-
duction function into costs of adjustment, with the following properties: G(bt,b t)=0 ,
G(bt,b t+1) > 0 for bt 6= bt+1 and G(bt,b t+1)=G(bt+1,b t). These costs of adjustment
can be understood as accelerated depreciation of the stocks of physical capital and
skilled labor or obsolescence due to technological change of those stocks. This idea of
a cost of adoption can be linked to the existing literature, where skills are technology
speciﬁc, as in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), or that technology is embedded in physi-
cal capital as in Jovanovic (1998). Those cases are extreme cases of a cost function,
where if technology changes skills or physical capital are completely useless under the
new technology, and therefore, in their cases, they have simultaneous presence of new
and old technologies, since the cost of changing skills or physical capital is extremely
high. This cost function can be understood as capturing the fact that some skills and
physical capital may not be appropriate under every technology. For example, the tran-
sition from steam to diesel locomotives, meant that some skills were not used anymore,
whereas others remain perfectly suitable under the new technology. So this technology
transfer cost function can be thought of as capturing an average cost of transition from
one technology to other.
The stocks of skilled labor, unskilled labor and physical capital, are divided as
4follows:
Upt + Uet + Spt + Set ≤ 1 (2.3)
Kpt + Ket ≤ Kt (2.4)
Upt ≥ 0,U et ≥ 0,S pt ≥ 0,S et ≥ 0 (2.5)
Where a variable with a subscript p denotes that that variable is being used in the
production of ﬁnal goods, and a variable with an e subscript denotes a variable that is
being used in the production of skilled workers (interpreted as the educational sector).
Variables without p or e subscript denote aggregates of physical capital or skilled labor.
The production of skilled labor is given by a function H (Ket,S et,U et). Where I
interpret the function H (Ket,S et,U et) as the output of the educational sector. There-
fore Setdenotes the skilled workers in the educational sector, or teachers, Uet denotes
the students and Ket the physical capital in the educational sector.
The law of motion for the stocks of physical capital and skilled workers are as follows:
St+1 ≤ St [1 − δs − G(bt,b t+1)] + H (Ket,S et,U et) (2.6)
Kt+1 ≤ Kt [1 − δk − G(bt,b t+1)] + It (2.7)
Combining (2.2) and (2.7) we get
Ct + Kt+1 ≤ F (bt,K pt,S pt,U pt)+Kt [1 − δk − G(bt,b t+1)] (2.8)
5So, the problem can be written as, maximize (2.1), subject to (2.3), (2.4), (2.5),
(2.6), and (2.8)
Functional forms
Following Moscoso Boedo (2006) I keep with my choices of functional forms for
the utility function, production function, the educational function and the technology
change cost function. The model stated above requires the choice of functional forms
for the functions u(), F(), G(),a n dH().














This function satisﬁes the requirements stated above, G(bt,b t)=0and
G(bt,b t+1) > 0 for bt 6= bt+1.
Note that the function G(bt,b t+1) is convex, which is in line with a whole literature
of convex adjustment cost, which induce the planner or the market to take small steps
in adjusting the technology instead of taking big jumps. Also note that the function
G(bt,b t+1) has the property that its derivatives in steady state are equal to zero. The
function G(bt,b t+1) is aﬀected by only one parameter, ζ.A s ζ increases the costs
associated with technological change (in terms of skilled workers and physical capital),
6increase, aﬀecting the dynamic transition oﬀ the model (while not in steady state).
The choice of the production function of ﬁnal goods, F(), is not straightforward.
Since one of the features I want the model to capture is the evolution of the skill
premium, it should be the case that skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes.
Therefore I restrict the attention to the family of nested CES functions, with inputs
Kp,S p and Up.L e t Ω(At,B t;a, ) be a CES function between inputs At and Bt with
weights parameter a and elasticity parameter  . The technological choice of interest
is constrained to the skill biased parameter, which I will call b for "bias". Therefore I
restrict the attention to the CES weights between terms containing skilled workers and
unskilled workers1. Then the possible nested CES forms are:
• F1 = Ω(Ω(Ut,S t;b,ρ 1),K t;a,ρ2)
• F2 = Ω(Ω(St,K t;a,ρ1),U t;b,ρ 2)
• F3 = Ω(Ω(Ut,K t;a,ρ1),S t;b,ρ 2)
F1 is the production function of choice in both Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
and Caselli and Coleman (2005). The problem with this functional form is given by
the fact that in steady state Fb (b,Kp,S p,U p)=0which requires that U = ιS, where ι
denotes some constant, independent of the level of T.F.P. The condition of U = ιS is
a direct consequence of the linearity of the CES function with respect to b.
F2 is the production function used by Krusell et. al. (2000). They argue in
favor of F2 instead of F3 because data collected by Hamermesh (1993) suggest that the
elasticity of substitution between S and U is higher than that between S and K, and
1Even though it is conceivable that one could make the choice of technologies be that of choosing all
the parameters in the production function (ρ1,ρ 2,a,b), I restrict the attention to only b.
7function F3 restrict them to be equal. This feature in the data comes from estimates
of the partial elasticity of substitution, which depends on the levels of S, U and K,
and not only on the substitution parameter. As I show later, the partial elasticity of
substitution in speciﬁcation F3 b e t w e e nSa n dUi sh i g h e rt h a nt h a tb e t w e e nSa n dK .
The problem with speciﬁcation F2 is that under the parameters suggested by Krusell
et. al. (2000), the endogenous technological change goes towards higher intensities in
the use of unskilled labor. One alternative would be to use F2 under a diﬀerent set of
parameters, but that would violate the moments estimated by Krusell et. al. (2000), in
particular the elasticities of substitution between capital, skilled workers and unskilled
workers. That is why I choose form F3 as the production function in the paper2.
To summarize the production function used in the quantitative exercise is given by















Finally the function H() is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:




The speciﬁcation of the law of motion for the stock of skilled workers in equation
(2.6) does not restrict St to be less than 1, in the case of high enough Ke. Even though
this is possible, the planner never chooses an St > 1 because the productivity of the
2F
3 is also the production function of choice in Funk and Vogel (2004).
Under the set of parameters chosen in table 1, the form F
3 does match the elasticities of substitution
estimated by Hamermesh (1993), which were close to the ones estimated by Krusell et. al. (2000)
8unskilled workers approaches inﬁnity as Ut approaches zero.
3. Calibration
In order to proceed with the calibration and to make things simple, I will use the
same calibration as Moscoso Boedo (2006), where parameters where calibrated to the
US economy circa 1990. The only parameter that will be calibrated to the former
communist economies will be the total factor productivity parameter z which will be
set to match the Russian GDP according to Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) relative
to the US, which was around 30%. The parameter values presented in table 1, are set
so as to match as close as possible the moments presented in table 2.
Therefore, the parameter values are:
Table 1: Parameter values in the model
Parameter zψµaρ 1 ρ2 ξδ s δk βϕζ
Value .52 .2 .75 .5 .75 −.2 .1759 .02 .08 .9 622 3
Which match the following moments for the US economy around 1990.
9Table 2: Identifying moments.
Comparison between the model and the data in 1990
Moment Model Data US, 1990
Skill Premium 1.88 1.873
Skilled workers .87 .944
Consumption Output Ratio .83 .795
Primary students over Labor Force .177 .1646
Expenditure per pupil over GDP per worker .1258 .11327
Capital Share of GDP .2915 .3




In order to analyze the collapse of the communist regime, one must deﬁne what the
regime meant in terms of the model. One alternative would be to follow Moscoso
Boedo (2006b), and incorporate a government into the model, where this government
taxed close to 100% of income and transferred equally across workers. If we do that,
3Return to 8 years of schooling calculated as exp(ωt8), where ωt equals the return to one year of
high school for "All men" reported by Goldin and Katz (1999).
4From DeLong, Goldin and Katz (2003) average between 1980 and 2000 for workers with less than
8 years of schooling.
5This is the ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Personal income reported by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, in its table 2.1 for the year 1990
6Calculated as the ratio of students enrolled in primary school times the participation rate over the
total labor force. Source: Statistical Abstract of The US for 1994 (data taken for 1990).
7Obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US 1990
8Obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US for 1990
9σS,U equals the partial elasticity of substitution between S and U. Therefore,
σS,U
σS,K is the ratio of
partial elasticities of substitution between S and U and S and K. According to Krusell et al (2000) it
is 2.49, which is based in turn in calculations reported by Hamermesh (1993)
10the technology parameter at taxation level close to 100% is around .6. A simpler way to
proceed is to set that technology parameter equal to .6 and derive a steady state where
that parameter is not a choice anymore. Then, the transition from a centrally planned
to a market economy is modeled as an expansion of the set of available technologies.
So, in 1990, this economies changed regimes, from one with a b-parameter ﬁx e di n. 6t o
one where it is a choice variable. Alternatively, the regime change can be interpreted
as a change in the technology change parameter ζ from ∞ to some ﬁnite value.
Given the calibration the initial level of b is about 20% above the level that a planner
with the choice of technology would have picked. So, the experiment consists on starting
on a steady state level with the technology parameter ﬁxed at 20% above its steady state
when b is a choice variable, and allow the economy to transit to its new equilibrium.
We assume that TFP remains constant. Thus, it is possible to view this experiment
as tracking the dynamics of the economy to a one time change in the cost of adjusting
technologies, ζ, which we assume took place around 1990.
Alternatively, we can view the regime change as lifting constraints on the govern-
ment. Starting with a constraint towards maximum redistribution, the government
under the old regime was forced to tax almost all the income from both workers and
capital, and suddenly that redistribution constraint was lifted, allowing the markets to
operate without extremely high tax rates. So, under almost 100% tax rate the incen-
t i v e sw e r en o tt h e r ef o rt h ec r e a t i o no fs k i l l e dw o r k e r s ,a n dt h e r e f o r ei tw a so p t i m a l
to adopt technologies that were relatively intensive in the use of the unskilled work-
ers. Once tax rates are lowered, the creation of skilled workers increases and also the
economy experiences a transition towards skill intensive technologies.
Inequality measure
In terms of inequality, the data available is in terms of Gini coeﬃcients. Milanovic
11(1998) reports the evolution on Gini coeﬃcients on income per capita for 18 former
communist countries for the years 1987/88 and 1993/95. He ﬁnds that in all of the
countries but The Slovak Republic, the Gini coeﬃcient suﬀered a sharp increase in that
period. The average Gini coeﬃcient jumped from 24 to 33, with extreme cases such as
the Kyrgyz Republic, where the Gini coeﬃcient was 26 points in 1987/88 and 55 points
in 1993/95.
In the model the Gini coeﬃcient is computed using labor income. Skilled workers
S receive wages ws, and unskilled workers Up receive wages wu. In addition to those
elements, I will also consider the fraction of workers that go back to the educational
system because they have to build skills that are needed in the new economy. These
workers will be paid some fraction of the unskilled wage. So, there is some fraction
of workers Ue that represents the unskilled workers in the educational system. This
fraction Ue will be divided into two, ﬁrst c Ue which is determined by the steady state
level of Ue and represents students in the educational level. The rest, namely Ue − c Ue
represents unskilled workers that are not in the production process because they are
building skills demanded in the "new" economy.
So, in every period, I will have 3 elements in order to compute the model’s version
of the Gini coeﬃcient: max(Ue − c Ue,0) workers earning ωwu where ω represents the
fraction of the unskilled worker that the workers that are building skills for the new
economy get10, S workers earning ws and Up earning wu. Since the results depend on
the chosen value of ω Figure 4.1 plots the evolution of the Gini coeﬃcient for diﬀerent
levels of ω.
10ω is introduced to make the model comparable to the data. According to Milanovic (1998), the
subsidies in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was around
30%-50% of the average wage































Figure 4.1: Evolution of the gini coeﬃcient as a fuction of ω
Dynamic analysis
As it can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 the behavior of the Gini coeﬃcient and
income depend on the payments to newly created unskilled workers that are generating
the skills required in the new regime. Note that increases of more than 50% in terms
of Gini coeﬃcients correspond to the cases of low payments to unskilled workers. This
workers can be interpreted as re investing in skills under the capitalist regime. Also
the case with low subsidies to skill creation generates the observed pattern in terms of
the evolution of the total output. The case of subsidies lower than 30% of the wage
earned by an unskilled worker corresponds to decreases of up to 30% in total output as
discussed by Milanovic (1998). Milanovic (1998) also reports the average social subsidy
as a fraction of the average wage rate for some former communist countries. In all the






















Figure 4.2: Evolution of the GDP per capita as a function of ω
cases the subsidy was around 30%-50%, which gives additional support to the ω being
in that range. Note that during the transition Ue − c Ue is positive, meaning that under
the new regime workers are reallocated to build skills initially and the fraction of those
being subsidized is greater initially, generating increases in income inequality. That
eﬀect is present even though the relative wages go initially in favor of the unskilled
wage.
It is important to keep in mind that throughout the experiment Total Factor Pro-
ductivity remains unchanged, so, if it were to increase, which is something that we could
expect that would make the recovery much faster.
When compared to the data, the model does a very good job in predicting the
14evolution of the GDP per capita11 a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e4 . 3




























Figure 4.3: Comparison of the evolution of the average GDP per worker in the commu-
nist countries vs that predicted by the model
The evolution of the average gDP per worker is matched almost completely up until
1997. This suggest that the initial phase of the transition may be explained by a model
of technical adoption. After 1997, the model loses predictive power, possibly due to
increases in TFP.
In terms of the Gini coeﬃcient, at ω between 30% and 50% the comparison between
t h ed a t aa n dt h em o d e li sg i v e nb yF i g u r e4 . 4 . T h e r e ,i tc a nb es e e nt h a tt h em o d e l
is close to the data at ω around 30% up to 1994, but that the model predicts decreases
in the level of inequality after the initial reaction. This is caused by the fact that
11Constructed as the unweighted average of the GDP per capita of the former communist countries
i nE a s t e rE u r o p ea n dt h eS o v i e tU n i o nw i t hd a t as t a r t i n gi n1 9 9 0i nt h eP e n nW o r l dT a b l e s .
15the model is only capturing a transition eﬀect generated by the reallocation of workers
between the educational and productive sectors. After 1994, the model is incapable to
match the relative stable evolution of Gini Coeﬃcient.














Figure 4.4: Comparison of the evolution of the gini coeﬃc i e n ti nt h ed a t aa n di nt h e
model at ω 30% and 50%. Data from TransMONEE (2005) for the gini on earnings
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of the underlying variables which helps in the under-
standing of the whole system.
Part A shows that the transition towards a technology with a higher skill bias pa-
rameter (1 − b) starts immediately but is smooth given the presence of the cost of
technical change. Given that the economy is transiting towards more and more skill
intensive technologies, the demand of skilled workers increases, but initially the stocks
are not suﬃcient, and therefore an important fraction of the unskilled workers are being
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Figure 4.5: Variables determined in the model
retrained (parts B and D). Part B shows that the "students" increased from around
10% of the population to almost 35% in only one year. In the model they are reallo-
cated to the educational sector, but in reality we can interpret them as acquiring the
skills needed to participate in the production process under the new regime. That can
be going back to school or being trained in the production sector for some time. Those
workers that were skilled before the change and became unskilled due to the sudden
technological change cannot be captured by looking at the years of school the worker
has and therefore the one to one comparison with the data in this dimension becomes
17impossible.
Note in part C that the capital share of GDP can be thought of as the mirror image
of the behavior of unskilled workers. That is because physical capital and unskilled
workers are substitutes, and in order for the planner to reallocate unskilled workers to
the educational sector, he invests in physical capital, and that is the reason that the
capital share increases during the transition. In other words, the economy temporarily
replaces part of the unskilled labor force with physical capital so as not to lose so
much output while labor resources are being shifted to the educational sector in order
to generate a larger stock of skilled workers to be able to maximize the production
possibilities under the new more skill intensive technology. Part F, shows the evolution
of the fraction of the population that is skilled. As an initial reaction it decreases
a little, given the technical change and the accelerated obsolescence induced by that
change, but then the big inﬂow of resources to the educational sector begins to pay oﬀ
and there is a considerable increment in the stocks of skilled workers.
Finally, part E shows the evolution of the ratio of wages of skilled to unskilled
workers. It shows that initially the skill premium decreases, and that is due to the
fact that the stocks of unskilled workers suddenly decreased due to the reallocation to
the educational sector. It also shows that the wage ratio is not responsible for the
considerable increases in the Gini coeﬃcient but the number of "new" or transition
students that earn a fraction ω of the unskilled wage.
5. Conclusion
A si tc a nb es e e nf r o mt h ee v o l u t i o no fb o t ht h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient and total output
generated by the model, the model has enough power to generate dynamics similar to
18those seen in the former communists countries in the early years of their transition
towards capitalism.
The model captures the time series of the GDP per capita as a result of a techno-
logical shift towards technologies ever more skill intensive. The reallocation of workers
between the educational sector and the productive one is responsible for the dynamic
behavior of the income inequality (sudden and large increases), together with a loss of
income of around 15%.
Unfortunately more accurate data is not available in order to judge the performance
of the model, but it seems that it performs well in cases of regime changes where these
induce technological change. Other application possible for this model could be the
transition during the 90s of the Latin American economies after they were opened to the
international markets. One addition that should be made to the model is the evolution
of total factor productivity, which will help understand longer transition and not just
the initial response to a regime change.
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